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Abstract—Security is of primary importance to vehicles. The
viability of performing remote intrusions onto the in-vehicle net-
work has been manifested. In regard to unmanned autonomous
cars, limited work has been done to detect intrusions for
them while existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) embrace
limitations against strong adversaries. In this paper, we consider
the very nature of autonomous car and leverage the road context
to build a novel IDS, named Road context-aware IDS (RAIDS).
When a computer-controlled car is driving through continuous
roads, road contexts and genuine frames transmitted on the car’s
in-vehicle network should resemble a regular and intelligible
pattern. RAIDS hence employs a lightweight machine learning
model to extract road contexts from sensory information (e.g.,
camera images and distance sensor values) that are used to gener-
ate control signals for maneuvering the car. With such ongoing
road context, RAIDS validates corresponding frames observed
on the in-vehicle network. Anomalous frames that substantially
deviate from road context will be discerned as intrusions. We have
implemented a prototype of RAIDS with neural networks, and
conducted experiments on a Raspberry Pi with extensive datasets
and meaningful intrusion cases. Evaluations show that RAIDS
significantly outperforms state-of-the-art IDS without using road
context by up to 99.9% accuracy and short response time.
Index Terms—Autonomous Car, Road Context, IDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is critical for vehicles. A modern automobile
embodies a protocol, like the Control Area Network (CAN)
bus [1, 2], for in-vehicle communications among its electrical
subsystems, including the steering wheel, brake, and engine,
each of which is monitored and controlled through an elec-
tronic control unit (ECU). Researchers managed to manifest
concrete intrusions to ECUs of manned vehicle to cause a
breakdown or traffic accident [3]–[6]. Today, many technology
giants, startups, and academic researchers are developing self-
driving autonomous cars, which, undoubtedly, demand partic-
ular care for security and safety [7, 8]. The fatal accidents in
Uber’s and Tesla’s autopilot tests have alerted people to such
unmanned vehicles [9, 10]. However, limited work has been
done on designing an intrusion detection system (IDS) for the
in-vehicle communications of autonomous car. Existing IDSs
even have limitations against strong adversaries. Take the state-
of-the-art CIDS [4] for example. In accordance with its knowl-
edge of the fingerprints (i.e., clock skews) of all ECUs, CIDS
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tracks down anomalies when an original ECU stops sending
frames or an ECU belonging to adversaries injects frames.
Whereas, CIDS should be oblivious of a compromised ECU
sending forged frames. If a strong adversary can manipulate an
original ECU to deliver fake frames, CIDS would malfunction
since the fingerprint of the ECU is not peculiar. In other words,
such an attack model is beyond the capability of CIDS.
There is a fact that has not been considered in designing
IDS to protect in-vehicle network: all frames transmitted on
the CAN bus are generated due to the decisions made by the
vehicle driver and it is the road context that guides a driver
to make those decisions. Human drivers have highly individ-
ualized experiences and habits [11]. They react differently to
the same road context, like a stop sign or a road bend. It
is hence impractical to design an IDS with road context for
manned vehicles. By contrast, an autonomous car is orthogonal
to manned vehicles concerning the very nature of ‘driver’. In
a computer-controlled autonomous car, decisions are made by
a well-trained self-driving model upon dynamic road contexts
obtained through multiple sensors [12, 13]. Therefore, the road
context and corresponding control signals, which eventually
result in frames transmitted on the CAN bus, shall resemble a
regular and intelligible pattern for autonomous car. Given an
intrusion with forged frames upon continuous road contexts,
a violation of the pattern must be perceivable.
Motivated by this observation, we develop a holistic IDS for
autonomous cars, namely Road context-aware IDS (RAIDS),
to detect anomalous CAN frames issued by strong adversaries.
The main ideas of RAIDS, also the main contributions of this
paper, are summarized as follows.
• RAIDS is a two-stage framework that mainly consists of
two neural networks to extract road context from sensory
information (e.g., images taken by cameras, distances to
front objects, etc.) and validate the genuineness of CAN
frames, respectively, for the purpose of intrusion detection.
Both neural networks are designed to be lightweight and
efficient regarding the computational resources of an in-
vehicle embedded computing system.
• To extract road contexts, the neural network at the first
stage of RAIDS processes camera images and other sen-
sory information that are concurrently used by the self-
driving model to control the car. The second stage of
RAIDS is a binary classifier that verifies whether the
frames observed on the CAN bus are abnormal or not with
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
00
73
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 A
ug
 20
19
regard to the extracted road contexts.
We have built a prototype of RAIDS. A convolutional neural
network (CNN) makes the backbone of RAIDS’s first stage for
extracting and abstracting road contexts from camera images.
The second stage of RAIDS mainly leverages linear layers
to efficiently discern anomalous CAN frames with extracted
road context. To evaluate RAIDS, we follow state-of-the-art
work [14] and implement an IDS that learns from historical
CAN frames without considering road context. We run both
IDSs in a Raspberry Pi with extensive datasets. On defending
two types of intrusions, i.e., abrupt and directed intrusions,
RAIDS substantially outperforms the IDS without road context
by up to 99.9% accuracy and short response time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present the background and related works. In Section 3,
we show the motivation of this paper and attack model we
consider. In Section 4, we detail the design and implementation
of RAIDS. In Section 5, we present the evaluation results of
testing RAIDS. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORKS
Intrusion Detection System The necessity of intrusion
detection system (IDS) is concrete for a vehicle. A number
of IDSs have been proposed targeting the in-vehicle net-
work [1, 4, 15]–[18]. An automobile is made of multiple
electrical subsystems, each of which has an electronic control
units (ECU) to communicate with other subsystems to control
the vehicle. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is the most
widely employed protocol for in-vehicle communications.
ECUs encapsulate data in CAN frames and put them on the
CAN bus. A CAN frame contains no identity information
of sender or receiver for simplicity. The lack of identity in
CAN frames facilitates adversaries in fabricating hazardous
messages. Worse, modern vehicles are being connected to the
outside world via multiple channels, which leave exploitable
attack vectors for adversaries to leverage.
One common mechanism of IDS is to observe and analyze
frames transmitted among ECUs so that anomalous CAN
frames can be detected. For example, Mu¨ter and Asaj [16]
proposed an entropy-based approach. They found that frames
on the CAN bus are more ‘regular’ than ones on the computer
networks, which leads to a relatively low entropy for CAN
frames. As a result, injecting or dropping CAN frames should
evidently increase the entropy of in-vehicle network and in
turn expose an intrusion. Song et al. [18] worked in a similar
fashion but used the time interval between CAN frames to
inspect suspicious frames. Taylor et al. [14] emphasized on
the data transmitted on CAN bus and proposed a recurrent
neural network (RNN) based anomaly detector. Their RNN
is trained with historical normal CAN bus data so as to
predict forthcoming frames and apprehend abnormal ones.
Whereas, their experiments for detecting anomalous frames
were done by manually flipping unused bits of data in a CAN
frame to emulate an ‘unusual case’. Such a manipulation is
irrational as skilled adversaries must have a good knowledge of
transmitted data and tend to fabricate meaningful but harmful
frames. Wasicek et al. [6] proposed to learn the ‘intra-vehicle
context’ by collecting the values of multiple sensors installed
in a vehicle’s subsystems and building reference models to
detect anomalies. We note that their ‘context’ is the internal
context among a vehicle’s subsystems and has no relation to
road context. In the meantime, Cho and Shin [4] proposed
Clock-based IDS (CIDS) that used the clock skew of ECUs
to fingerprint them. Leveraging the unique clow skew of each
ECU, CIDS can not only detect the occurrence of intrusions,
but also locate the compromised ECU.
Autonomous Car & Neural Network There are different
levels of automated driving [19]. In this paper, we consider an
autonomous car that is computer-controlled most of the time
except for emergency cases, such as an intrusion to in-vehicle
network. Multiple sensors are installed to control an au-
tonomous car, including cameras, ultrasonic distance sensors,
radar, etc. Such sensory information reflects and resembles
real-world road context, and advises the self-driving model to
generate control signals. Control signals are transformed to
data encapsulated in frames transmitted on the CAN bus.
Numerical sensor values, like the distance to front objects,
are computer-readable and can be directly utilized by the
self-driving model of autonomous car. The camera images,
however, must be processed to acquire high-level informative
properties. Nowadays, neural networks have emerged as the
mainstream approach that deals with images for self-driving.
For example, the convolutional neural network (CNN) has
been proved to be effective in extracting image features to
maneuver the autonomous car [13, 20]–[22]. A CNN makes
use of convolutional layers that apply multiple kernels to
extract embedded visual features. A kernel is a small matrix
of numbers. An image can be viewed as a large matrix
that comprises many small sub-matrices with the kernel size.
Convolutional layer convolves (i.e., slides) each kernel over
sub-matrices of image to do matrix multiplication. The output
of a convolutional layer is thus a feature map that bundles
results of convolving multiple kernels. In a CNN, feature maps
of several convolutional layers, after being computed through
hidden layers for reduction of computations and avoidance of
overfitting, will eventually make a vector that resembles the
features per image. Such a feature vector is expressive and
meaningful in image understanding [21, 23].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Motivation
Most IDSs were developed with regard to human-driven
vehicles. Today, many technology giants, startups, and aca-
demic researchers are developing autonomous cars, which,
undoubtedly, demand particular care for security and safety,
especially after two fatal accidents that successively happened
in Uber’s and Tesla’s self-driving tests [9, 10].
Limited work has been done on detecting intrusions to the
in-vehicle network of autonomous car. Worse, state-of-the-
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Fig. 1. An Illustration of Different Reactions of Human-driven and Au-
tonomous Cars on a Stop Sign
art IDSs embrace limitations against strong adversaries. For
example, CIDS [4] is able to detect intrusions when a foreign
ECU injects messages or an existing ECU stops sending
messages based on its knowledge of fingerprints (i.e., clock
skews) of ECUs. However, if adversaries compromise an ECU
and use it to send fake messages, CIDS will be ineffective as
the fingerprint is not suspicious. In other words, CIDS should
be oblivious of compromised ECUs sending fake messages.
Such intrusion cases are beyond the capability of CIDS.
In practice, frames transmitted on the CAN bus are gen-
erated when drivers encounter dynamic road contexts. Let
us assume a stop sign as the road context ahead. A driver
must decelerate and eventually stop the car for a moment.
The ECU of accelerator accordingly produces and delivers
CAN frames with decreasing speed values. Figure 1(a) and
Figure 1(b) illustrate how two human drivers react when they
move towards a stop sign. One driver gradually reduces speed.
The other one decelerates only when being close to the stop
sign. Because human drivers have different experiences and
habits, they behave differently on the same road context and
their reactions entail diverse CAN frames [11].
When a car is controlled by a well-trained self-driving
machine learning model, however, its behaviors should be
smooth and stable. As shown by Figure 1(c), an autonomous
car starts to reduce speed on spotting the stop sign and steadily
slows down in order to approach the stop line. This results
in CAN frames with consistently decreasing speed values.
Concretely, the road context (i.e., a stop sign) and CAN
frames (i.e., decreasing speed values) construct a regular and
consistent pattern for autonomous car. Assume that adversaries
compromise the accelerator of autonomous car shown in
Figure 1(c) and continually put frames with non-decreasing
speed values on the CAN bus. These abnormal frames are
easy to be ruled out as they significantly deviate from the
pattern supposed for a stop sign.
To sum up, given a specific road context, the consequential
CAN frames generated by an autonomous car are regular and
predictable. If we monitor ongoing road context and validate
against observed CAN frames, anomalous frames shall be
detectable. This observation motivates us to make a new Road
context-aware IDS (RAIDS) for autonomous car.
B. Attack Model
A number of network connections exist in an autonomous
vehicle to help it communicate with the outside world. These
connections yet provide attack vectors for adversaries to
exploit. We assume that strong adversaries further have good
knowledge of in-vehicle network, including the format and
frequency of CAN frames issued by an ECU, and also manage
to force an ECU to encapsulate and send their data in CAN
frames. With such knowledge, adversaries are able to remotely
access and manipulate critical ECUs of an autonomous car,
such as the steering wheel, brake, and accelerator. In this paper,
we consider an attack model that is beyond the capability of
state-of-the-art IDSs, i.e., forgery attack.
The process of a forgery attack is as follows. Once ad-
versaries compromise an ECU on the in-vehicle network, they
first intercept the normal frames sent and received by the ECU
in order to study the ECU’s behavior and data format. Then
adversaries start forging and sending CAN frames strictly with
the original frequency. Nevertheless, the data put in forged
frames is made either inappropriate or opposite due to the
malicious intentions of adversaries. For example, upon a left
turn, adversaries may replace CAN frames of the steering
wheel with right turn angles so as to wreck the car.
Forgery attack has two variants.
• Abrupt intrusion: adversaries abruptly place anomalous
CAN frames with abnormal data at a random time to cause
a disorder.
• Directed intrusion: adversaries monitor the road context at
runtime and, upon a specific scenario, like a road bend or
traffic light, place anomalous CAN frames that significantly
violate the road context.
Both types of intrusions are harmful. Assuming that the self-
driving model is unaware of any intrusion, the consequence
of directed intrusion is more detrimental as the CAN frames
imposed by it are to inflict a sudden flip to the vehicle’s state,
like the aforementioned right turn upon a left turn.
IV. RAIDS
A. Overview of RAIDS
As its name suggests, the essence of RAIDS is to leverage
the ongoing road context to validate whether CAN frames on
the in-vehicle network are normal or not for an autonomous
car. If the CAN frames closely match the corresponding
road context, RAIDS deems that there is no security threat.
Otherwise, RAIDS will report the occurrence of intrusion.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of RAIDS1. As shown by
the leftmost of Figure 2, the ongoing road context is reflected
by a variety of sensory information, such as the distances
to surrendering objects, the water level implying a rainy
slippery road, and camera images showing the front scene.
Numerical sensory information is computer-readable while
camera images must be processed. The self-driving model
depends on sensory information to decide how to maneuver the
1The images used in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 are from
the dataset of Udacity self-driving challenge [24] under MIT license.
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Fig. 2. An Illustration of RAIDS’s Architecture
autonomous car. In the meantime, sensory information is also
delivered to RAIDS. RAIDS is mainly composed of two neural
networks. One neural network is responsible for processing the
camera images which cannot be instantly utilized. The image
is first preprocessed through techniques like normalization
and centering. Then RAIDS uses one neural network, as
shown at the central part of Figure 2, to extract and abstract
image features. These image features will be concatenated with
other numerical sensory information to make a vector of road
context. On the other hand, as illustrated by the lower half
of Figure 2, the self-driving model produces control signals
upon the sensory information, which eventually conveys a
number of CAN frames transmitted on the in-vehicle network.
These CAN frames are formulated into another vector that is
fed along with the vector of road context as two inputs to the
second neural network of RAIDS. As shown by the rightmost
part of Figure 2, with well-trained parameters learned from
historical road contexts and CAN frames, the second neural
network shall tell whether abnormal frames emerge on the
CAN bus or not. RAIDS immediately informs the self-driving
model once any anomaly is detected.
If an intrusion is reported, RAIDS suggests that the self-
driving model should 1) first disable external network con-
nections to block remote adversaries, 2) stop the vehicle for
emergency if possible, and 3) raise a switch request to human
driving. These steps aim to mitigate the impact of intrusions.
B. Road Context
We define the road context as the information an au-
tonomous car is encountering when it is cruising. In summary,
the road context includes but not limited to, 1) the road
conditions, like lane line, cross, bend, joint, and fork of roads,
2) the traffic light, pedestrians, vehicles, obstacles, bumps, and
pits around the autonomous car, 3) the weather conditions,
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Fig. 3. An Illustration of the Impact of Road Context on CAN Frames
such as rain, fog, cloud, and snow, and 4) the sunrise, sunset,
night and tunnel lights. These road contexts are perceived
by multiple sensors installed in the autonomous car, such as
cameras, ultrasonic distance sensors, water sensor, etc.
The road context determines control signals made by the
vehicle driver, which, with regard to the computer-controlled
autonomous car, is the self-driving model. Different road
contexts shall entail different signals, which in turn gener-
ate different frames on the in-vehicle CAN bus. Figure 3
instantiates the impact of road curves on the control signal.
As shown in Figure 3(a), on a highway that is continuously
straight, the self-driving model demands the autonomous car
to move straightforward and run at a velocity of 70km/h. By
contrast, upon a road bend as illustrated in Figure 3(b), the
framework shall decrease the car’s velocity to 45km/h and
turn to the left with an angle of 30°. Assuming that on the
road shown in Figure 3(b), a frame with a steering angle of
0° for moving straightforward, rather than the rational frame
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Fig. 4. The Architecture of RAIDS’s CNN
of left turn with 30°, emerges on the CAN bus, an intrusion
should have taken place because the anomalous frame is not
congruent with the ongoing road context.
CAN frames are ever-changing due to dynamic road con-
texts from time to time. The tight relation between road
context and CAN frames indicates that road context must be
exploited as a crucial parameter to detect intruions initiated
onto the in-vehicle network. We hypothesize that the self-
driving model of autonomous car is intact and always makes
wise and regular decisions upon dynamic road contexts. In
other words, an autonomous car is a contrast to manned
vehicles in which human drivers may behave inconsistently
from time to time even regarding the same road context [11].
In addition, we note that the focus of this paper is on detecting
security threats imposed by adversaries onto ECUs and in-
vehicle network. Readers may refer to other studies for the
vulnerability exploration of deep learning models that drive a
vehicle [25]–[28].
C. Extracting Road Context
We first need to extract the road context in order to leverage
it for intrusion detection. As a matter of fact, most of the
road context is reflected by the front scene that autonomous
car is facing, including the aforementioned road condition,
traffic light and weather. Such a scene is tracked by multiple
sensors. Numerical sensory information, like the distance to
front objects, can be directly utilized by RAIDS since they
are both human- and computer-readable. The images captured
by cameras, however, need to be converted into a format that
RAIDS can deploy. As a result, the difficulty of obtaining road
context lies in how to process camera images.
As mentioned in Section II, the feature vector obtained in a
deep neural network is a promising abstraction of road context
contained in an image for RAIDS to leverage for intrusion
detection. Concretely, we construct a CNN as the backbone of
the first stage of RAIDS to extract and abstract the road context
from camera images. Figure 4 sketches the architecture of
the CNN employed by RAIDS to process images. It mainly
consists of two convolutional layers. After being preprocessed,
the first convolutional layer would apply 24 kernels, each of
which is 3×3 with a subsampling step2 of 2, to generate a
2A subsampling of 2 means that the convolutional layer moves each kernel
by 2, rather than 1, when sliding over the large matrix of image, to reduce the
dimensionality of feature map but without losing important information of the
image. So the size of feature map for one kernel is 100
2
× 100
2
= 50× 50.
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Fig. 5. An Illustration of Extracting Features from Images by RAIDS’s CNN
feature map (50×50×24). This feature map goes through a
rectified linear unit (ReLU), which is the activation function
used in our implementation, and then reaches the second
convolutional layer. The second convolutional layer applies 64
kernels, each of which also has 3×3 size with a subsampling
step of 2. The second feature map is hence 25×25×64, and
would entail a feature vector of 100×1 after passing one
dropout layer and two dense layers.
Figure 5 exemplifies the feature maps visualized after two
convolutional layers for two images from Udacity dataset [24]
when they are being processed by the CNN of RAIDS. A
comparison between Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) confirms
that different road contexts lead to different intermediate
features. In the end, the feature vector of each image would
be assembled with numerical sensor values into a new vector
as one of the inputs to the second stage of RAIDS.
The CNN extracting image features for RAIDS works
synchronously with the self-driving model of autonomous car,
because RAIDS should verify CAN frames produced by the
self-driving model on the same road context. RAIDS’s CNN is
simpler than the self-driving model’s. The reason is twofold.
First, the self-driving model does not terminate with image
features but has to accordingly do further computations to
determine control signals subsuming left or right steering with
a degree, acceleration with a velocity, brake with a force, etc.
Second, the feature vector generated by the CNN of RAIDS
can be coarse-grained as long as they are sufficiently accurate
for detecting intrusions at the second stage of RAIDS.
D. Intrusion Detection with Road Context
After obtaining the vector of road context and CAN frames
corresponding to the road context, we can establish a model
between them by learning over historical records of road
contexts and CAN frames. With the model, RAIDS vali-
dates whether observed CAN frames approximately match the
newly-arrived image and sensor values. By doing so, RAIDS
determines the genuineness of CAN frames. A substantial
discrepancy would lead to a report of intrusion.
TABLE I
THE DATASETS AND INTRUSIONS USED TO EVALUATE RAIDS
Datasets Sources
Genuine Steering
Manipulations of Abrupt Intrusion Manipulations of Directed IntrusionAngle Ranges in
Radian
Udacity Udacity self-driving challenge [24] [-2.05, 1.90] Randomly select 30% images and for an image, add or sub-
Udacity sim Udacity simulator [29] [-0.94, 1.00] tract a random value in [0.1, 0.9] to its corresponding angle. Select the largest 15% and smallest
Apollo Road Hackers platform in Baidu [-0.38, 0.21] Randomly select 30% images and for an image, add or sub- 15% angles. Flip the sign of a selectedApollo Project [30] tract a random value in [0.08, 0.5]to its corresponding angle. angle if its absolute value is larger
Chen 2017 Recorded by Sully Chen in 2017 [31] [-1.99, 0.55] Randomly select 30% images and for an image, add or sub- than 0.3; otherwise, add or subtract a
Chen 2018 Recorded by Sully Chen in 2018 [31] [-2.01, 0.68] tract random value in [0.2, 0.9] to its corresponding angle. random value in [0.5, 1].
Comma.ai Comma.ai highway driving [32] [-1.64, 1.29] Randomly select 30% images and for an image, add or sub-tract a random value in [0.25, 1] to its corresponding angle.
As historical records of sensory information and CAN
frames are known as normals, how to detect intrusions on
the in-vehicle network regarding road context turns to be a
problem of developing a supervised learning model to check
CAN frames upon forthcoming sensory information. Assume
that N items of sensory information are used for training.
The ith sensory information (0 ≤ i < N ) has a vector of
road context ri obtained through the first stage of RAIDS.
Still for the ith sensory information, CAN frames issued by
ECUs like steering wheel, accelerator, and brake have been
collected and presented in a vector ci. In the perspective of
supervised learning, we can make a label λi (‘1’ for normal
and ‘0’ for anomaly) for ri and ci. Given these N tuples
forming a training dataset, i.e.,
{〈r0, c0, λ0〉, 〈r1, c1, λ1〉, ..., 〈ri, ci, λi〉, ...,
〈rN−1, cN−1, λN−1〉}, (1)
RAIDS’s supervised learning attempts to seek out a model,
g(ri, ci) ≈ λi, (0 ≤ i < N). (2)
Or put in another way,
g : R×C → Λ, (3)
in which R, C, and Λ are the domain spaces of road contexts,
CAN frames, and labels, respectively.
The function g should be one that the best describes the
relationship between R, C, and Λ. For a new element of
R × C, which will be forthcoming road context rx and its
corresponding vector of CAN frames vx, RAIDS computes
g(rx, vx) and obtains a label λx. If λx is ‘0’, RAIDS deems
there would be no intrusion at that moment. Otherwise, RAIDS
informs the self-driving model of a possible intrusion on the
CAN bus. Consequently, the second stage of RAIDS is for-
matted as a problem of binary classification. In the prototype
of RAIDS, we build a classifier that is mainly composed of
two linear layers. There are two reasons to do so. First, ri, vi,
and λi are numerical vectors. Linear layers are sufficient to
speculate their relationship. Second, linear layers bring about
relatively simpler computations, which are especially efficient
concerning the response time of IDS and the computational
resources of an embedded computing system.
E. Training and Testing
As mentioned, the backbones of the first and second stages
are a CNN and a binary classifier, respectively. They are based
on Keras [33] and PyTorch [34] frameworks. We follow an
end-to-end learning fashion [13, 35] to train RAIDS. The loss
function is BCELoss (Binary Cross-Entropy loss) provided
by PyTorch for binary classification [36]. We would use six
datasets to evaluate RAIDS (more details can be found in
Section V). In each dataset, we use 70% images and CAN
frames for training while the 30% remainders are used for the
purpose of testing. We note that because datasets have different
image sizes, RAIDS would have different implementation
variants to deal with respective datasets.
V. EVALUATION
We have performance evaluations to answer three questions.
Q1. Does RAIDS achieve high accuracy in intrusion detec-
tion? Is the performance of RAIDS stable over different
datasets?
Q2. How is the efficacy of RAIDS? Does it cost reasonable
response time to detect an intrusion in an embedded
computing system?
Q3. Is RAIDS effective in detecting intrusions under more
difficult road contexts?
A. Evaluation Setup
Datasets We have used six datasets from five sources.
Their descriptions are presented in Table I. Except Udac-
ity sim that includes images recorded in a synthesized simu-
lator, all other datasets were collected in the real world. These
datasets contain a large number of records with images and
corresponding data conveyed in CAN frames.
Road Context As mentioned in Section IV-B, the road
context is a broad concept and covers many aspects of the
environment where a vehicle is cruising. Concretely, we would
place emphasis on the road conditions reflected by camera
images, such as lane lines, road bends, and turns. There are two
reasons to do so. First, not all datasets provide extra numerical
sensor values. Second, less sensory information imposes more
challenges in precisely obtaining road context.
On the other hand, at the standpoint of adversaries, we
would focus on intrusions onto the steering wheel. The reason
is threefold. First, the steering angle is one vital control signal
for autonomous car and attracts wide attention for research.
Second, the steering angle is ever-changing along the road
while the control signals from accelerator and brake remain
relatively stable for a moving vehicle. Figure 6 sketches two
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Fig. 6. The Curves of Steering Angle and Vehicle Speed over Time with
Udacity’s HMB 6 Dataset
curves for the steering angle and vehicle speed at runtime,
respectively, with one Udacity sub-dataset (HMB 6). It is
evident that the curve of vehicle speed is much smoother than
that of steering angle. Therefore, an intrusion to compromise
steering angle is more difficult to be detected. Third, some
datasets, like Chen 2017 and Chen 2018, only include the
runtime values of steering angle.
Intrusions We consider forgery attack (cf. Section III-B)
in evaluation. We have performed abrupt and directed in-
trusions to the values of steering angle with each dataset.
In contrast to existing works that encapsulated meaningless
data in CAN frames or fabricated artificial CAN frames, our
intrusions would generate a CAN frame that should be with an
allowable value but does not match the ongoing road context.
In other words, such forged CAN frames emerge alongside
inappropriate road contexts. The rightmost two columns of
Table I brief how we manipulate steering angles to produce
abrupt and directed intrusion cases. Note that the datasets
have different ranges for steering angles. For example, for the
HMB 6 sub-dataset of Udacity shown by Figure 6(a), steering
angles fall in [-0.17, 0.11] while the range for Chen 2018 is
[-1.99, 0.55]. For each dataset, we hence apply appropriate
values to modify the steering angles so as to make intrusion
cases which are not trivial to be perceived.
Competitor Some existing IDSs like CIDS are ineffec-
tive against forgery attacks. We implement an IDS without
considering the road context (referred to as IDS wo rc) for
comparison. It is identical to the start-of-the-art IDS proposed
by Taylor et al. [14]. In brief, IDS wo rc depends on learning
CAN frames with RNN to determine whether an arriving
frame contains genuine data or not. For IDS wo rc, 70% of
each dataset is used for training while 30% is for testing,
the same as what we do with RAIDS. For both RAIDS and
IDS wo rc, training is performed in a Linux server while
testing is done in a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ [37]. Python 3.5
is installed in both the server and Raspberry Pi. We assume
that an embedded system being with Raspberry Pi’s computing
powers exists within the in-vehicle network gateway [38]
where the IDS resides for autonomous car.
Metrics The main metric we use to compare RAIDS and
IDS wo rc is the detection accuracy in testing, i.e., the ratio
of detected normal and intrusion cases against overall cases.
A higher detection accuracy means a better effectiveness of
IDS. We also measure the ratios of undetected intrusion cases
as well as false alarms by which an IDS wrongly labels a
normal CAN frame to be anomalous. To study the efficiency
of RAIDS, we record the average and maximum response time
RAIDS spends in processing all cases of a dataset.
B. Detection Accuracy
Detection Accuracy Figure 7 summarizes the detection
accuracies of RAIDS and IDS wo rc with six datasets un-
der abrupt and directed intrusions. Two observations can be
obtained from Figure 7. An apparent one is that, RAIDS
consistently achieves high detection accuracies across differ-
ent datasets under both abrupt and directed intrusions. In
particular, the highest accuracy for RAIDS is 99.9% with
Apollo under directed intrusion while its lowest accuracy is
89.5% with Comma.ai under abrupt intrusion. Comparatively,
IDS wo rc yields lower detection accuracies. IDS wo rc’s
highest accuracy is 84.5% with Apollo under directed in-
trusion while its lowest accuracy is 71.8% with Comma.ai
under abrupt intrusion. The significant gap between RAIDS’s
and IDS wo rc’s accuracies confirms the high effectiveness
of RAIDS. RAIDS differs from IDS wo rc in that RAIDS
leverages the road context for intrusion detection. IDS wo rc
solely relies on the data of historical CAN frames to apprehend
the newly-arrived CAN frame. As shown in Figure 6(b), the
runtime volatile curve of steering angle alone is difficult
to be modeled, unless it is associated with corresponding
road context, like what RAIDS does. So the model built
by IDS wo rc lacks reliability. RAIDS, on the other hand,
extracts a feature vector of road context from each image and
involves the feature vector for validating corresponding CAN
frames. RAIDS thus establishes a sound model that maps a
specific road context, like a road bend shown in Figure 3(b),
to CAN frames. In summary, if adversaries put frames with
abnormal data on the in-vehicle CAN bus, the unreliable
model of IDS wo rc is ineffective in identifying the anomaly;
however, on account of the involvement of road context,
RAIDS has a high likelihood of detecting the intrusion.
The second observation obtained from Figure 7 is that
the detection accuracy under directed intrusion is consistently
higher than that under abrupt intrusion, especially for RAIDS.
For example, with Udacity, Apollo and Comma.ai datasets, the
accuracy of RAIDS under directed intrusion is 4.0%, 5.4% and
7.2% higher than that under abrupt intrusion, respectively. As
mentioned in Section III-B, directed intrusion should be more
hazardous than abrupt intrusion because the former intends to
incur a sudden change at a specific occasion onto the in-vehicle
communications. Such a sudden change, whereas, brings in
more significant violation to ongoing road context, which
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Fig. 8. The Percentages of Unreported Intrusions and False Alarms for Two IDSs under Abrupt and Directed Intrusions
exactly matches the capability of RAIDS and can be easily
captured. This explains why RAIDS yields higher detection
accuracy under directed intrusion. On the other hand, as shown
in Figure 6(a), there exist dramatic increase and decrease of
steering angle at runtime in reality. Consequently, IDS wo rc
does not raise much difference in accuracy, i.e., at most 5.4%
with Apollo.
Unreported Intrusions We also record the percentages
of detected and unreported intrusions as well as detected
normals and false alarms for six datasets under two types of
intrusions. These results help us gain a deeper understanding
of the accuracies of RAIDS and IDS wo rc. They are detailed
in Figure 8. Let us first focus on the percentages of detected
intrusion cases as the percentage of false alarms are generally
low. An obvious observations is that, in all 16 diagrams,
RAIDS detects most of the intrusion cases while IDS wo rc
even cannot detect half of them. For example, in Figure 8(i),
the percentages of detected and unreported intrusion cases are
87.2% and 12.8%, respectively, for RAIDS with Chen 2018
under abrupt intrusion; however, they are 35.0% and 65.0% for
IDS wo rc, respectively. In other words, without considering
road context, IDS wo rc ignores many intrusion cases. This
in turn justifies the importance of road context in intrusion
detection. In addition, as mentioned, the accuracy of Apollo
under directed intrusion is 99.9%. From Figure 8(f), we can
see that there is hardly unreported intrusion or false alarm.
This reaffirms the highest accuracy achieved by RAIDS.
Second, let us make a comparison between abrupt and
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Fig. 9. The Average and Maximum Response Time of RAIDS under Two Intrusions
directed intrusions. Take Chen 2018 dataset for example again
with Figure 8(i) and Figure 8(j). The percentage of detected
intrusion cases for RAIDS increases from 87.2% under abrupt
intrusion to 96.5% under directed intrusion. Such an increase
confirms that directed intrusion is likely to incur intrusion
cases that are easier to be perceived. Comparatively, the
percentage of detected intrusion cases for IDS wo rc also
jumps from 35.0% under abrupt intrusion to 42.5% under
directed intrusion. Although the difference is considerable
(42.5% − 35.0% = 7.5%), it is less than that of RAIDS
(96.5% − 87.2% = 9.3%). These numbers agree with the
second observation we have had with Figure 7, and explain
why the accuracy of IDS wo rc does not increase as much as
that of RAIDS from abrupt intrusion to directed intrusion.
C. Response Time
With Raspberry Pi, we have measured the response time
of RAIDS in detecting intrusions for six datasets. The two
diagrams in Figure 9 capture the average and maximum
response time of processing all records of images and cor-
responding CAN frames under abrupt and directed intrusions,
respectively. The results shown in Figure 9 state that none of
the average response time is greater than 0.40 second. More
important, the maximum response time, which meas the worst-
case response time, is mostly no greater than 0.52 second,
except with Chen 2018 for which RAIDS cost 0.66 second
under abrupt intrusion. Concretely, the short response time
justifies the efficiency of RAIDS.
The average response time does not deviate much from the
maximum response time because each record contains almost
the same quantity of data, i.e., image and CAN frames, for
RAIDS to handle. The marginal deviation is mainly caused
by other running programs and system scheduling in a real
embedded system. We note that we have used an economical
Raspberry Pi for testing. The computational resources of
Raspberry Pi includes an inexpensive 1.4GHz ARM CPU and
1GB DRAM. With regard to employing RAIDS in real-world
autonomous cars, a more powerful embedded system with
high-end CPU and large RAM space could be leveraged to
reduce the response time, which surely improves efficiency
and applicability of RAIDS.
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Fig. 10. A Comparison between Daytime and Nighttime Datasets for RAIDS
D. The Impact of Daytime and Night
It is non-trivial to extract meaningful features from night-
time images due to the generally low visibility of road con-
ditions [39]. In fact, Uber’s fatal accident happened at night
when a pedestrian was crossing a road [9]. Comma.ai provides
a sub-dataset with nighttime images and CAN frames (referred
to as Comma.ai night). We have done abrupt and directed
intrusions with it. Because of space limitation, we present
the results under directed intrusion. Figure 10(a) captures the
comparison of IDS wo rc’s and RAIDS’s accuracies between
daytime Comma.ai and nighttime Comma.ai night. In fact, the
accuracy of IDS wo rc does not fluctuate much since it is
oblivious of the change of day and night. Nevertheless, due to
the weaker perception of road context at night, the accuracy
of RAIDS drops by 3.3%.
Let us do a comparison between Figure 8(l) for Comma.ai
and Figure 10(b) for Comma.ai night. In particular, from
Figure 8(l) to Figure 10(b), the percentages of unreported
intrusions and false alarms for RAIDS increase by 4.6% and
2.7%, respectively. In other words, a bit more intrusion and
normal cases have been wrongly deemed to be anomalous with
regard to the relatively obscure nighttime road contexts. This
exposes the reason for the accuracy drop of RAIDS.
VI. CONCLUSION
Security is always critical for traffic vehicles. In this paper,
we investigate how to effectively detect intrusions to the in-
vehicle communications of autonomous car. In an unmanned
autonomous car, a self-driving model reads sensory informa-
tion reflecting dynamic road contexts and generates control
signals that are eventually transformed into frames transmitted
on the CAN bus. The ever-changing control signals at runtime
require the involvement of road contexts in detecting intrusions
for autonomous car. We accordingly develop RAIDS. RAIDS
extracts and abstracts road contexts from sensory information
into a feature vector. It then leverages such an expressive
feature vector of road context to assert the genuineness of
observed CAN frames. We have built a prototype for RAIDS
through lightweight neural networks, and evaluated it in an
embedded computing system with extensive datasets. Exper-
imental results confirm that RAIDS achieves up to 99.9%
accuracy with short response time.
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